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Abstract     
The reform of EU economic governance since the outbreak of the euro area crisis has not stopped at 
the borders of Economic and Monetary Union. With the introduction of macroeconomic 
conditionalities in all European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), EU cohesion policy is now 
closely linked to the Stability and Growth Pact. The European Commission is expected to propose the 
suspension of ESIF funding in case of non-compliance with the Excessive Deficit Procedure. This article 
focuses on Portugal and Spain, which were nearly sanctioned under the macroeconomic 
conditionalities in 2016. It will address the question of why the application of this sanctioning 
procedure was softened compared to the hardness of its legal provisions. Drawing on the ‘usage of 
Europe’ approach and on the concepts of hard and soft law, this article argues that the usage actors 
make of a procedure has an influence on its legal character at the enforcement stage. This article finds 
that the hard law character of the procedure was softened by the European Commission’s flexible 
application of the provisions and by the European Parliament’s strategic usage of the rules.  
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Cohesion policy, as one of the EU’s few redistributive policy fields, provides important financial 
resources to EU member states for investment in line with the EU’s economic priorities. The 
institutional setting of EU economic governance has been subject to significant change since the 
outbreak of the euro area crisis that has not only reinforced the rules of fiscal and macroeconomic 
surveillance, coordination and enforcement, but has also linked the European Structural and 
Investment Funds1 (ESIF) to the rules and objectives of fiscal and economic policy coordination. In the 
2014-2020 funding period, several mechanisms are in place to link ‘the effectiveness of ESI Funds to 
sound economic governance’ (European Union 2013). The economic rationale behind the introduction 
of macroeconomic conditionalities was the supposed necessity of a sound fiscal framework for 
investment to be effective (European Commission 2011). The European Commission has been given 
considerable enforcement power in imposing this link between cohesion policy and economic 
governance. It can now request revisions to member states’ Partnership Agreements when it is 
deemed necessary for supporting the implementation of a relevant Country-Specific Recommendation 
issued under the European Semester. More strikingly, the Commission has to propose to the Council 
the suspension of ESIF commitments or payments if a member state does not take effective action to 
correct its excessive deficit under the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (European 
Union 2013). While macroeconomic conditionalities already existed for the Cohesion Fund, 
conditionality is now extended to all ESIF (Viță 2017). The extension of macroeconomic conditionalities 
was debated in the context of the negotiations of the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, at 
the height of the euro area crisis. It has been subject to significant opposition, especially from the 
European Parliament (European Parliament 2013). The economic rationale of sanctioning non-
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compliance with fiscal rules through the suspension of investment resources has been criticised on the 
grounds of its potentially counterproductive impact on the goal of cohesion, its de facto punishment 
of regions for the action of central governments (see Begg, Macchiarelli, Bachtler, Mendez, et al. 2014) 
and its potential pro-cyclical impact (see Huguenot-Noël, Hunter and Zuleeg 2017). 
The application of the extended macroeconomic conditionalities was triggered for the first time in 
2016. The Spanish and Portuguese governments, which were both under the corrective arm of the SGP 
(the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)) since 2009, had failed to take corrective action to address their 
excessive deficits. The Council Decisions of 12 July 2016 that established this failure triggered the 
sanctioning procedure under the macroeconomic conditionalities, as well as a sanctioning procedure 
based on SGP legislation according to which the Commission is supposed to propose to the Council the 
imposition of a fine. This latter proposal can be circumvented if justified by exceptional economic 
circumstances (European Union 2011). The suspension of ESIF commitments or payments can, 
however, only be lifted if the EDP is held in abeyance or if the Council abrogates the decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit. Exceptional economic circumstances cannot serve as a justification 
for avoiding a suspension proposal.  
The Commission did not propose a fine for the two countries’ non-compliance under SGP rules, taking 
into account their reasoned requests and exceptional economic circumstances (European Commission 
2016a). Meanwhile, the proposal for a suspension of ESIF commitments was postponed until after a 
structured dialogue with the European Parliament had been held and the two countries had submitted 
their Draft Budgetary Plans (DBP) under the European Semester. Despite its mandatory character, the 
proposal for a suspension was not finally issued. The Commission took the decision to hold the EDP in 
abeyance after its assessment of the member states’ reform plans, and the proposal for a suspension 
therefore became obsolete (European Commission 2016b). Given the Commission’s legal obligation to 
propose a suspension, the application of the procedure seems to have been softened compared to the 
letter of its legal basis.  
While a sanctioning procedure under Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that did not lead to the 
imposition of sanctions is not exceptional in its outcome, the sanctioning procedure under the 
macroeconomic conditionalities is exceptional in its mandatory and quasi-automatic character. 
Therefore, it relates to the debate on the power of supranational actors under the institutional setting 
of post-crisis EMU. The academic debate on the impact of EU economic governance reforms upon the 
power relations between national and supranational actors points to increased surveillance and 
enforcement powers in the hands of the European Commission (Dehousse 2016, Chang 2013; Bauer 
and Becker 2014), with the Commission having greater margin of manoeuvre on rule interpretation 
and application (Schmidt 2016), but depending on the case applying the rules either in a flexible or in 
a rigid manner (Vanheuverzwijn 2017). The debate on the changing institutional setting and the 
potential enforcement of rules in economic governance has also been approached from a legal angle, 
pointing to an increased hardening of soft law governance procedures (Terpan 2015; Saurugger and 
Terpan 2016a; Hodson 2018). While this legal approach allows for a precise characterisation of the 
institutional setting, the legal character of governance procedures does not allow for any predictions 
as to how the actors apply the provisions in practice (Hodson 2018).  
As argued by Vanheuverzwijn (2017), an analysis of power relations in the area of EU economic 
governance should go beyond formal competences and include the use and reinterpretation of 
incomplete rules. In a similar way, this article argues that when engaging in the debate on rule 
enforcement in EMU, and while avoiding to take preferences as given, it is crucial to take into account 
the use actors make of the reformed institutional setting. This allows us to understand the 
consequences of reform for the relation between actors. When it comes to the question of sanctions 
under EMU, some scholars link the enforcement of sanctions with the overall success of the 
surveillance tool (Gros and Alcidi 2015). However, others argue that the flexible application of the rules 
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can be taken as a sign of the Commission’s discretionary power rather than as a weakness (Seikel 2016) 
and that the application of this flexibility is an indicator of the Commission’s gain in power (Dehousse 
2016). It is therefore difficult to draw conclusions as to the role of political actors and power relations 
from the provisions the actors have at their disposal, without analysing which preferences they pursue 
and in which way they use the provisions available to them.  
This article therefore aims to answer the following question: Why was the application of the 
sanctioning procedure under the macroeconomic conditionalities with regard to Spain and Portugal 
softened compared to the hardness of its legal provisions? The analysis draws on aspects of the ‘usage 
of Europe’ approach in combination with the concepts of hard and soft law in order to show the 
consequences of strategic action for the application of the procedure and the enforcement of the 
rules. It is argued that the action of the European Commission with regard to Spain and Portugal 
reflected an internal tension between the use of the shadow of hierarchy and the preference for a soft 
enforcement. At the same time, the European Parliament opposed the suspension of ESIF 
commitments and strategically used the rules of the sanctioning procedure to soften its application.  
 
THEORETICAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
The ‘usage of Europe’ approach  
In order to better understand the strategic action political actors engage in within the institutional 
setting of the sanctioning procedure under the macroeconomic conditionalities, this article draws on 
aspects of the ‘usage of Europe’ approach. This approach aims to bridge the gap between sociology 
and rational choice theory by studying ‘the social construction of rational or strategic behavior’ (Woll 
and Jacquot 2010: 111). Based on this approach, this article assumes that actors’ preferences are not 
a given, but socially constructed. Hence, this article aims to demonstrate how the social construction 
of preferences and the usage of resources matter for macroeconomic conditionalities as a governance 
procedure. In this context, a rational choice approach, such as Principal-Agent theory that takes 
preferences as a given (see Pollack 2003) would not be appropriate for the purpose of this article. 
Additionally, sociological institutionalism, while enabling the analysis of the social construction of 
preferences (see Saurugger 2014), would not allow for a full understanding of the strategic usage of 
resources.  
Usages are understood as ‘practices and political interactions which adjust and redefine themselves 
by seizing the European Union as a set of opportunities, be they institutional, ideological, political or 
organisational’ (Jacquot and Woll 2003: 4). The approach puts individual actors at the centre of 
analysis. It assumes that the institutional context is subject to interpretation by the actors and can be 
transformed by their actions. As stated above, while actors are seen as rational and strategic, their 
preferences are socially constructed (Woll and Jacquot 2010).  
The three ideal types of usages are cognitive, strategic and legitimating usage. Cognitive usage occurs 
when usage is related to interpretation and understanding of political subjects. Ideas can accordingly 
be used as a mechanism to persuade other actors. The second type of usage is strategic usage that 
actors apply when trying to influence decisions or their room for manoeuvre while pursuing clearly 
defined goals. The third type of usage is legitimating usage that can be applied to justify political 
decisions. Unlike in actor-centred constructivism, the ‘usage of Europe’ approach does not focus on 
the strategic use of ideas only, but includes the usage of material elements such as institutions and 
budgetary and legal resources (see Woll and Jacquot 2010). 
The ‘usage of Europe’ approach has been applied recently in the area of EU economic governance by 
a number of scholars. Using this approach, Eihmanis (2018) shows how the Latvian government 
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instrumentalised EU recommendations in order to achieve its own policy targets. Moreover, Zeitlin 
and Vanhercke (2018) draw on both the ‘usage of Europe’ approach and on actor-centred 
constructivism to demonstrate how social and employment actors have progressively socialised the 
European Semester.  
The ‘usage of Europe’ approach stems from the Europeanisation literature that tries to explain the 
influence of European integration on national political systems (Jacquot and Woll 2003). The approach 
is part of a sociological turn within this research agenda that criticises the former dominant claim that 
change at the national level can best be explained by the degree of difference between EU policy 
proposals and existing national traditions. Rejecting this misfit model, it is argued that policy actors 
are more than mere mediating factors acting under institutional constraints. Even where no adaptive 
pressures prevail, the EU can provide material and cognitive resources that can be used strategically 
by national actors (Woll and Jacquot 2010). The approach has above all been used to understand how 
national level actors make strategic use of opportunities at the EU level to pursue domestic objectives. 
However, the approach also provides analytical value for the analysis of EU-level processes and can go 
beyond the focus on domestic considerations by explaining, for example, ‘how actors situated at the 
intersection between national and supranational policy-making […] may strategically exploit the 
ambiguities of European concepts, rules and procedures’ (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2018: 154). Usages of 
material and ideational resources can serve the interests of both national and supranational actors 
and, if applied, will similarly shape EU-level procedures as they can shape domestic practices. This 
approach therefore allows us to analyse how EU-level actors use the institutional setting in order to 
articulate and strategically pursue their interests. While studying the actors’ usages, it will further be 
possible to shed light on their preferences. 
Soft and hard law as a measure of potential enforcement 
In this analysis, it is assumed that ‘all policy processes leave open some room for manoeuver and thus 
[require] the mediation of actors’ and that ‘it is not their a priori “degree of coercion” that matters, 
but the usages that are made of them, their concrete implementation and the meaning that actors 
attach to them’ (Woll and Jacquot 2010: 118). The ‘usage of Europe’ approach therefore seems 
particularly adept to analyse how the legal coercion created through the macroeconomic 
conditionalities is applied in the case of Spain and Portugal. In order to analyse the consequences of 
the usages made by the actors, and therefore the actual coerciveness of the procedure, this article 
further draws on the concepts of hard and soft law. Terpan (2015), based on the concept of legalisation 
put forward by Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter et al. (2000), distinguishes between hard and 
soft law according to two criteria: obligation and the enforcement of the obligation. The level of 
obligation is determined by the hardness or softness of the source and the content, assuming that 
imprecise rules lead to weaker obligations than detailed rules that offer less room for interpretation. 
With regard to enforcement, Terpan (2015) distinguishes between hard enforcement, soft 
enforcement and the absence of enforcement mechanisms. While hard enforcement is characterised 
by judicial control or very constraining non-judicial control that can take the form of a binding decision 
of a supranational institution, soft enforcement is characterised by procedures aiming at compliance 
that do not necessarily rely on coercion or constraint. Taken together, a norm that relies on hard 
obligation and hard enforcement can be characterised as hard law, while soft law can be characterised 
by different combinations of hard and soft obligation as well as hard and soft enforcement. 
In the literature on EU fiscal and economic policy coordination, the hard and soft law approach has 
been used in order to identify the changing nature of coordination procedures (Terpan 2015), to define 
European integration and identify the increase thereof (Hodson 2018), and to analyse the political and 
economic role of soft and hard law components in the functioning of the SGP (Schelkle 2007; Hodson 
and Maher 2004). Additionally, this approach has served as a dependent variable in understanding the 
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direction of policy change during crises (Saurugger and Terpan 2016a) and as an independent variable 
in analysing member state non-compliance with EU norms (Saurugger and Terpan 2016b). Hodson 
(2018) considers that the concept of legalisation can also be used to analyse the effects of institutions 
at the implementation stage, in addition to the level of legalisation at the design stage. In line with this 
observation, this article argues that the hardness or softness of a procedure in terms of obligation and 
enforcement can also be used in order to analyse the actual application of a norm. It is further assumed 
that hard and soft law components of a procedure can be strategically supported or circumvented, 
thereby altering the character of the procedure either in the direction of hard or of soft law 
enforcement. In the present case, the threat of sanctions would represent the strategic support of a 
hard law component. This use of the shadow of hierarchy, or the threat of intervention by a 
hierarchical authority (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011), might induce member state compliance (Schelkle 
2007; De la Porte and Heins 2016). On the contrary, it might be the preference of an actor to use 
procedural flexibility that allows for a softer enforcement. In this article, it is therefore assumed that 
provisions that allow for hard law enforcement might be in place. However, the application and the 
degree of coercion depends on the preferences of the actors and how they make use of the provisions.  
In sum, this article draws on the ‘usage of Europe’ approach in order to show how actors shape the 
application of the procedure in terms of its hardness or softness. In the first section of the analysis, the 
macroeconomic conditionalities will be located on the soft-hard law boundary. This allows us to 
compare the application of the provisions with their potential application in terms of a harder or softer 
rule enforcement. The analysis starts with the enforcement preferences and subsequent actions of the 
European Commission and then focuses on the actions of the European Parliament. As the Council was 
formally not involved in the procedure, the analysis focuses on the Commission and the Parliament. 
As suggested by Saurugger (2016), process-tracing seems particularly adept for actor-centred 
sociological approaches and is therefore applied in this article. The analysis draws on legislation, official 
documents, press releases, video sources and press coverage. Additionally, for reasons of triangulation 
and in order to gain supplementary information on opinions, preferences and procedural steps, six 
semi-structured interviews were conducted. Two interviews were with Commission officials both at 
the DG and the Cabinet level, three with member state officials in Brussels and one with a Member of 
the European Parliament (MEP). Interviewees were identified via official websites, email and 
telephone enquiries as well as via referencing through interview partners. 
 
PORTUGAL AND SPAIN UNDER THE THREAT OF ESIF SUSPENSION 
The location of macroeconomic conditionalities on the soft-hard law boundary 
In order to analyse the influence actors’ usages have on the application and therefore the enforcement 
character of the sanctioning procedure under the macroeconomic conditionalities, the procedure and 
its mechanisms first have to be situated on the boundary between soft and hard law. As depicted 
above, the two components of legal norms that have to be distinguished are obligation and 
enforcement (Terpan 2015). The macroeconomic conditionalities link access to ESIF to performance 
under the SGP; if a member state is found not to have taken corrective action under the EDP, the 
conditionalities apply. Therefore, the source and the content of the obligation emanate from the SGP. 
Both point to rather hard obligation, which is nevertheless softened by exceptions regarding deficit 
and debt limits (Terpan 2015).  
With regard to the enforcement of the conditionalities, the SGP and the EDP no longer apply, but the 
rules exclusively emanate from the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) that lays down the 
macroeconomic conditionalities in its Article 23. Enforcement of the procedure can be described as 
hard. As written in the CPR, the Commission ‘shall’ propose to the Council the suspension of ‘part or 
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all of the commitments or payments for the programmes of a Member State’ if the Council decides 
‘that a Member State has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit’ (European Union 
2013). Therefore, there is a very clear obligation for the Commission to propose the suspension to the 
Council, which can only oppose the imposition of the suspension by reverse qualified majority voting. 
Unlike for the fine under SGP legislation, there is no possibility to cancel the suspension of ESIF 
commitments if justified by ‘exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by 
the Member State concerned’ (European Union 2011). The only circumstances foreseen by the CPR, 
under which the suspension can be lifted, are if the EDP is held in abeyance or if the Council decides 
to abrogate the decision establishing the existence of an excessive deficit.  
While the Commission is obliged to propose the suspension, it enjoys flexibility and discretion as to 
the nature of the suspension and its amount. According to the CPR, a suspension should cover 
commitments. Payments can, however, also be suspended if there is significant non-compliance. 
Regarding the amount of a suspension, the Commission enjoys flexibility and discretion, as the ‘scope 
and level of the suspension of commitments […] shall be proportionate, respect the equality of 
treatment between Member States and take into account the economic and social circumstances of 
the Member States concerned’ (European Union 2013: 351). Furthermore, the moment at which the 
suspension has to be proposed is not defined by the CPR. 
The flexibility in the application of the sanctioning procedure also has an inter-institutional character. 
The CPR lays down the possibility for the European Parliament to ‘invite the Commission for a 
structured dialogue’ that in particular allows for the transmission of information on ‘ESI Funds and 
programmes which could be subject to a suspension of commitments or payments’ (European Union 
2013: 352). When proposing the suspension, the Commission ‘shall give due consideration to any 
elements arising from and opinions expressed through the structured dialogue’ (European Union 2013: 
350) with the European Parliament. As shown below, these provisions give, as shown below, some 
scope for interpretation to both the European Commission and the European Parliament.  
Taken together, the procedure can be characterised by both a rather hard obligation and a rather hard 
enforcement component. There is, nevertheless, margin of manoeuvre that leaves room for 
interpretation and strategic action for both the Commission and the Parliament. This especially applies 
to the enforcement component that this analysis focuses upon. The provisions of the procedure 
therefore allow the actors to support either a hard or a soft application, and thereby, in the latter case, 
to soften the enforcement of the procedure. In the following section, the preferences and actions of 
the European Commission are analysed. Subsequently, the analysis focuses on the role of the 
European Parliament.  
The European Commission between the use of hard law provisions and the softening of the 
application  
At the beginning of the sanctioning procedure under the macroeconomic conditionalities, the 
Commission insisted on its mandatory character. This can be seen by the wording the European 
Commission used: ‘The Council decision also legally obliges the Commission to propose a suspension 
of part of the commitments of EU Structural and Investment Funds for 2017’ (European Commission 
2016c). At that moment, the Commission did not indicate when it would issue the proposal to suspend 
funds. However, it initiated the structured dialogue with the European Parliament, that is foreseen by 
the CPR (European Commission 2016c). The first hearing under this dialogue took place on 3 October 
2016. For the Commission, both the Vice-President for Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness, 
Jyrki Katainen and the Commissioner for Regional Policy, Corina Crețu responded to questions from 
members of the European Parliament’s Committees on Regional Development (REGI) and on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs (ECON), which came together in a joint session. Both Commissioners insisted 
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during the hearing that the European Commission would be obliged to issue the suspension proposal 
and stated that the suspension would be lifted once Spain and Portugal comply with their fiscal 
obligations (European Parliament 2016a). This presentation of the procedure and the emphasis on the 
countries’ obligation to address their excessive deficits can be characterised as a strategic usage of the 
potential suspension with the aim of enhancing or maintaining the reform pressure on the two 
member states. In terms of the soft-hard law divide, it clearly indicates the support of the hard law 
enforcement of the procedure that would translate into an effective shadow of hierarchy under which 
the member states would deliver on their obligations under the fiscal rules.  
Nevertheless, despite the Commission’s official stance that suggests an objective and technical 
application of the rules in accordance with its role as guardian of the treaties, the application of the 
procedure was not without controversy among Commissioners and Commission officials. According to 
one Commission official, ‘Both Vice-Presidents Dombrovskis and Katainen were strongly in favour of 
the idea of suspending the commitment. Mainly as a matter of principle for the credibility of the whole 
macroeconomic conditionality mechanism’.2 Commissioner Crețu had more reservations regarding the 
suspension because ‘of all the explanations that were provided by Spain and Portugal, they were 
actually finishing their reforms or doing a big effort socially and economically speaking’.3  In the 
European Parliament, the Commissioner accordingly described the obligation of proposing the 
suspension as ‘not comfortable’ (European Parliament 2016a). She stated that she was convinced that 
the two member states would present ‘important steps forward toward the SGP’ in their DBPs and 
announced that the mitigating factors that could be used to propose a lower amount of commitments 
to be suspended, would be taken into account (European Parliament 2016a). Similarly, evidence 
suggests that the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Pierre Moscovici was against the 
ultimate suspension of the commitments, but in favour of having the macroeconomic conditionalities 
as a safeguard instrument.4 A suspension of investment funds may further have been perceived as 
unfavourable for the achievement of the Commission’s economic policy and investment objectives as 
stipulated in the Europe 2020 Strategy and the 2016 Annual Growth Survey.  
There is evidence that the attitude towards strict sanctioning within the Commission services changed 
after the introduction of macroeconomic conditionalities in 2013. According to one interviewed 
Commission official, the initial rationale that saw the suspension of funds as a safety mechanism for 
guaranteeing the efficiency of ESIF spending, was not considered at the time of the application of the 
procedure.5  Even before the application of this provision with regard to Spain and Portugal, the 
general attitude within the Commission was less favourable towards harsh sanctioning.6 This 
corresponds to the flexible approach on fiscal policy coordination that the Juncker Commission publicly 
communicated (European Commission 2015). Accordingly, there was a tension within the Commission 
services between the obligation to propose the suspension and the political preference not to do so. 
This reluctance can also be explained by rising Euroscepticism and the fear that the suspension of ESIF 
commitments would feed opposition to the EU.7 The automatism of the procedure was seen as a 
political burden. Given that Portugal and Spain had just undertaken major restructuring efforts, the 
moment for suspending funds was not perceived as adequate.8 The obligation to propose the 
suspension was, nevertheless, strongly felt by the Commission services and they accordingly prepared 
the suspension proposal. This further suggests that the Commission services, as with Katainen and 
Dombrovskis, were concerned with saving the credibility of the procedure for potential future 
applications. At the same time, there was an agreement that the flexibility the procedure offered 
should be used.9  
Despite the rather negative attitude of the Commission services and relevant Commissioners towards 
the suspension of ESIF commitments, action under the procedure was informed by an understanding 
that the threat of sanctions could be used to incentivise member states to comply with their 
obligations under the EDP.10 Both the Portuguese and Spanish governments were indeed asked to 
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deliver upon their obligations. This can be illustrated by the Commission’s request for updated DBPs 
from the two governments after their initial submission in October 2016. In the case of Spain, the 
Commission was of the opinion that the proposed fiscal measures were not sufficient (European 
Commission 2016d), and in the case of Portugal, the Commission asked for supplementary information 
on how compliance would be ensured (European Commission 2016e).  
This also means that despite the flexible application of the procedure in terms of lowering the amount 
of commitments to be suspended, which tended towards softening the level of ultimate sanctioning, 
the harder shadow of hierarchy was strategically used to bring about policy change. As argued above, 
the Commission most likely sought to save the credibility of the procedure, as during its failed attempt 
in 2003 to move to the EDP’s next step in the case of Germany and France, which had preceded the 
first reform of the SGP in 2005 (Heipertz and Verdun 2010). Similarly, in a 2012 application of 
macroeconomic conditionalities in their pre-2014 form, the Commission actually proposed the 
suspension of Cohesion Fund commitments for Hungary, which the Council lifted shortly after having 
adopted it (Council of the European Union 2012). According to the evidence presented, it is highly 
likely that the Commission also would have proposed the suspension in the case of Spain and Portugal 
in order to save the credibility of the procedure. However, this was prevented by the strategic action 
of MEPs, as will be shown in the next section. 
Given that the Commission did not propose the suspension to the Council, member state 
representatives were formally not involved in the procedure.11 Indeed, interview partners did not 
provide any evidence of an active or influential informal role of Council members. However, unlike in 
other governance procedures under EMU, the European Parliament played an important role during 
the application of the procedure via the structured dialogue.12 The next section therefore focuses on 
the role and actions of the European Parliament during the structured dialogue it held with the 
European Commission.  
The European Parliament: enhancing its role and softening enforcement  
The European Parliament, which acted as co-legislator for the CPR, actively opposed the expansion of 
macroeconomic conditionalities (European Parliament 2013). The conditionalities in their current form 
are the result of a compromise among political groups and with the Council. Accordingly, the CPR 
foresees mitigating factors for the determination of the level of suspensions as well as the involvement 
of the European Parliament in the application of the conditionalities in the form of a structured 
dialogue.13 The structured dialogue, according to the CPR, mainly aims at informing the Parliament on 
which programmes could be suspended. The Commission is further not obliged to take into account 
the opinion of the Parliament (European Union 2013). Despite this rather narrow role for the European 
Parliament according to the Regulation, its involvement and impact has been significantly reinforced 
both by Commission action and the strategic usage that MEPs made of the provisions. 
Early in the procedure, Commission Vice-President Katainen proposed to cooperate with the 
Parliament over the question of which parts of the funds should be suspended (Handelsblatt 2016). 
Already at the beginning of the procedure, the Commission stated that it had ‘invited the European 
Parliament to hold a structured dialogue before presenting a proposal’ (European Commission 2016c). 
The Commission therefore actively promoted the involvement of the Parliament in the procedure 
beyond the wording of the Regulation. 
The European Parliament, in the context of the structured dialogue, had invited Vice-President 
Katainen and Commissioner Crețu for a hearing in a joint REGI and ECON committee meeting, which 
took place on 3 October 2016. A majority of MEPs spoke against the suspension of the funds, which 
reflected the strong opposition of the Parliament that was already present during the introduction of 
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the conditionalities. Despite the Commission’s announcement that only commitments and not 
payments would be suspended (European Parliament 2016a), MEPs who were against the suspension 
took a hard stance. In particular, they made use of cognitive references based on the idea that the 
suspension of the commitments would have a negative economic impact on citizens and regions 
(European Parliament 2016b). Despite a majority of MEPs arguing against the suspension of funds, 
liberals, eurosceptics and some members of the European People’s Party from northern European 
countries were in favour of the suspension of funding (Valero 2016). 
Beyond the use of cognitive references that suggest that the suspension of ESIF commitments might 
lead to the opposite result of what the conditionalities were aiming for, that is a stable fiscal situation, 
the European Parliament also engaged in strategic usage of the provisions of the procedure. After the 
first hearing with representatives of the Commission, the European Parliament’s Conference of 
Presidents decided to gather more information before the closure of the structured dialogue. 
Therefore, the Parliament invited the Portuguese Finance Minister Mário Centeno and the Spanish 
Economy Minister Luis de Guindos for a second hearing at the Parliament (European Parliament 
2016c). The European Parliament therefore used the setting of the structured dialogue in order to 
extend its visibility beyond a dialogue between the Commission and the Parliament, as foreseen by 
the CPR, and created a direct link with the member state governments concerned. Consequently, both 
ministers benefited from the extended involvement of the Parliament in the procedure. They argued 
in a similar way as those MEPs who were against the suspension by referring to the potential negative 
consequences of this measure, and stated their willingness to commit to reforms in order to avoid the 
suspension of funds (European Parliament 2016c). 
The organisation of a second hearing improved the visibility of the European Parliament in the 
procedure and provided a forum for the Spanish and Portuguese ministers to present their vision on 
the suspension of ESIF commitments. However, this second hearing also reflects the strategy of the 
Parliament to prolong the structured dialogue in order to prevent the suspension. As there was no 
‘legally binding deadline for the Commission to propose the suspension’ (European Commission 
2016c), the Commission enjoyed flexibility in this regard and decided to wait until the end of the 
structured dialogue with the Parliament before making a proposal.14 At the same time, the Commission 
was under time constraints, as the suspension would have had to be included in the 2017 annual 
budget to become effective. It therefore asked the Parliament to speed up the procedure.15 The 
strategy of the MEPs was, however, to extend the structured dialogue formally in order to give more 
time to the Spanish and Portuguese governments to comply with their obligations under the EDP and 
thereby to prevent the Commission from proposing the suspension.16 This means that the European 
Parliament engaged in strategic action that aimed at preventing the hard shadow of hierarchy in the 
form of the suspension from taking effect and therefore at moving the procedure towards soft 
enforcement. 
The Parliament had introduced the structured dialogue during the negotiation of the CPR. The overall 
negative opinion of the Parliament regarding macroeconomic conditionalities had not changed since 
then. It could therefore use the dialogue according to the purpose of its creation, namely to prevent 
an automatic imposition of sanctions. It did so by using cognitive references against the suspension, 
giving the Spanish and Portuguese governments a stage to present their willingness to comply with 
their obligations under the SGP, and by strategically using time as a resource. 
The Spanish government committed, upon the Commission’s request, to revise its fiscal target in order 
to comply with the recommendations under the EDP (Spanish Government 2016). The Portuguese 
government, after a Commission request, delivered supplementary information on its DBP 
(Portuguese Government 2016). In line with the strategy of the European Parliament to give more time 
to Spain and Portugal to present new figures, both countries were found to be in compliance with the 
EDP (European Commission 2016f) before the structured dialogue was finished.17 The EDP was held in 
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abeyance, and therefore the obligation to propose the suspension was, according to the Commission, 
no longer present (European Commission 2016b). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article aimed to explain why the application of macroeconomic conditionalities with regard to 
Portugal and Spain was softened despite the hard law character of the corresponding legal provisions. 
The analysis has shown that the Commission’s role during the application can be characterised by a 
tension between the obligation to propose the suspension of ESIF commitments and the prevailing 
internal opinion that a suspension would not be appropriate in light of the economic situation in the 
countries concerned. This tension is reflected in the Commission’s use of the threat of sanctions as an 
instrument to push Spain and Portugal to comply with their obligations under the EDP, while 
nevertheless opting for a soft and flexible approach concerning the amount of commitments to be 
suspended. MEPs engaged in strategic action that aimed to prevent the hard shadow of hierarchy in 
the form of the suspension from taking effect and thereby moved the procedure in the direction of 
soft enforcement. They did so by using the idea that the suspension of the funds would have a negative 
economic impact and by strategically using the resource of time. By prolonging the structured 
dialogue, the European Parliament gave more time for Portugal and Spain to present new figures. 
Ultimately, both countries were found to be in compliance with their fiscal obligations before the 
Commission could propose a suspension. 
 
In conclusion, it can be shown that the mandatory and thus hard law character of the procedure was 
softened by the European Commission’s flexible application of the provisions and by the European 
Parliament’s strategic usage of the procedure. The application of macroeconomic conditionalities with 
regard to Portugal and Spain is therefore a good example of how strategic usage can shape the 
application of procedures in terms of their hardness or softness. 
 
The experience with Portugal and Spain is likely to have long-term implications. The dilemma in which 
the Commission was caught is reflected in its reform proposal for the relevant provisions post-2020. If 
the proposed changes are adopted, they would create more leeway for the Commission by allowing 
the cancellation of an ESIF suspension based on exceptional economic circumstances or a reasoned 
request by the member state concerned (European Commission 2018). In line with its critical stance 
on macroeconomic conditionalities, the European Parliament, in a draft report on the Commission’s 
proposal, does not touch upon the proposed introduction of these mitigating factors, and proposes to 
soften the procedure further by abolishing the possibility to suspend payments instead of 
commitments (European Parliament 2018). It remains, however, to be seen how member state 
governments will position themselves on the prospect of rendering the procedure less automatic. 
The ‘usage of Europe’ approach offers useful tools to shed light on how EU-level actors use the 
sanctioning procedure under the macroeconomic conditionalities, their scope for discretion and 
interpretation, and on the rationale that links cohesion policy and fiscal policy coordination. The 
application of this theoretical framework has also shown that in order to understand the functioning 
of governance instruments such as the macroeconomic conditionalities, analysis should be actor-
centred. It is precisely the actors’ preferences and usages that play a significant role in the functioning 
of governance procedures. Therefore, a high level of detail can enhance our understanding of current 
institutional developments. 
The question of whether the hard and soft law provisions had a direct influence on the actions of the 
Spanish and Portuguese governments is beyond the scope of this analysis and empirically difficult to 
prove. The short timeframe of the analysis and the single application of the procedure in its current 
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form further limits potential findings on the long-term impact of usages on preferences and 
subsequent applications. Nevertheless, the approach allows for an in-depth analysis of the application 
at hand and of the preferences of the main actors. Other than understanding the imposition of 
sanctions as the only governance tool of the procedure, the threat of potential sanctions has been 
used by the Commission with the aim of bringing about policy change. While it may seem contradictory 
that the Commission strategically uses the procedure while at the same time holding the opinion that 
sanctions are not the best course of action, this observation actually supports the idea that sanctions 
are generally supposed to be used in severe situations, and are mainly an instrument to induce policy 
change. Therefore, the usefulness of the SGP and the role of the Commission in policy enforcement 
should not be assessed based on the imposition of sanctions, but by considering the strategic use of 
the provisions of the procedure and the variety of goals that can be pursued using the threat of 
sanctions. The results of this analysis are of further relevance in light of the increasing reliance on 
conditionalities in wider EU governance, which might even link ESIF funding to respecting rule of law. 
However, even strong conditionality provisions are no guarantee for strict enforcement, as the 
effective character of the provisions will depend on their use by European and national actors. 
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